DR. VRUSHALI VASANT YADAV V. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 2025:BHC-KOL:3962-DB:

DATE: 16/12/2025

COURT: High Court of Bombay

BENCH: Justice M. S. Karnik & Justice Ajit B. Kadethankar

FACTS:

The petitioner is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at Rajarshree Chhatrapati Shahu Maharaj Government Medical College, Kolhapur, appointed on a temporary basis since 21 September 2018. Despite the temporary nature of her appointment, she worked continuously and without interruption, except for minor “technical breaks” of one or two days after completion of fixed service periods. In May 2021, while she was eight and a half months pregnant, the petitioner applied for maternity leave benefits for the period from 8 May 2021 to 16 September 2021, amounting to 131 days, relying upon the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and relevant Supreme Court precedents.

The respondent authorities did not grant the maternity leave benefits and instead treated the said period as leave without pay, resulting in non-payment of approximately ₹4,36,666. Although the Dean of the Medical College forwarded the petitioner’s request to higher authorities seeking guidance, no affirmative decision was taken. The denial was primarily based on the ground that temporary women employees who were given periodic technical breaks were not entitled to maternity benefits. Despite repeated opportunities granted by the Court, the respondents failed to file an affidavit-in-reply, compelling the Court to proceed on the basis of the uncontroverted averments made by the petitioner.

ISSUES:

The principal issue before the Court was whether a woman employee appointed on a temporary basis and subjected to technical breaks in service is entitled to maternity leave benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, and whether denial of such benefits solely on the ground of technical breaks in service is lawful and justified.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Court allowed the writ petition and held that the petitioner was entitled to maternity leave benefits for the period claimed. It directed the respondents to grant and disburse the maternity benefits as demanded in the petitioner’s application dated 28 May 2021. The Court further ordered that if the amount was not paid within four weeks, it would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum until actual disbursement.

The Court observed that Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 unequivocally entitles every woman employee to maternity benefits provided she has worked for at least eighty days in the twelve months preceding the expected date of delivery. The petitioner had not only fulfilled this statutory requirement but had also rendered continuous service since 2018. The Court emphasized that the expression “technical break” could not be used as a device to deny substantive statutory rights, especially when the employee had, in reality, worked continuously and discharged her duties without interruption.

Relying on binding precedents such as Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Badri Mali, the Court reiterated that maternity benefits extend even to women employed on daily wages, contractual, ad hoc, or temporary basis. The Court held that a contrary interpretation would defeat the benevolent and welfare-oriented object of the Maternity Benefit Act. Denial of maternity benefits solely due to minor technical breaks was found to be arbitrary, unjust, and discriminatory, and therefore legally untenable.

ANALYSIS:

This decision reinforces the welfare-oriented and purposive interpretation of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, particularly in the context of temporary and contractual employment in public institutions. By focusing on the substance of employment rather than its form, the Court rejected the respondents’ reliance on “technical breaks” as a ground to deny maternity benefits. The ruling underscores that artificial interruptions in service, when an employee has otherwise rendered continuous and uninterrupted work, cannot be used to defeat statutory protections meant to safeguard motherhood and gender equality at the workplace. The Court’s approach aligns with constitutional principles under Articles 14 and 42, which mandate non-arbitrary treatment and just conditions of work, especially for women.

Further, the judgment carries significant implications for employment practices in government-run institutions, where temporary appointments with periodic breaks are common. By extending maternity benefits to such employees, the Court effectively curbs exploitative administrative practices that undermine labour welfare legislation. The reliance on established Supreme Court precedents affirms that maternity benefits are not contingent upon the nature of appointment but on the fulfillment of statutory conditions. Overall, the ruling strengthens the jurisprudence that maternity benefits are an inalienable right flowing from employment itself, and any interpretation diluting this right would be contrary to the legislative intent and the broader goals of social justice.