The present criminal revision arose from a
cognizance and summoning order dated 19.01.2024 passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, in a complaint filed by the Drugs Inspector
against M/s Marion Biotech Pvt. Ltd. and its directors and officials. The
complaint alleged multiple violations of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940,
including manufacture and sale of drugs declared “not of standard quality,”
adulterated and spurious drugs, procedural non-compliance, and vicarious
liability of company officials. The prosecution was founded primarily on
government laboratory test reports which revealed the presence of Ethylene
Glycol (EG) and Diethylene Glycol (DEG), toxic and prohibited substances in
cough syrup manufactured by the company.
The revisionists, who were directors and
officers of the company, challenged the summoning order contending that they
were mechanically summoned without specific averments regarding their role,
responsibility, or active involvement in the alleged offences, as required
under Section 34 of the Act. They also alleged procedural irregularities in
sampling, testing, sanction under Section 32, and improper invocation of
stringent penal provisions relating to adulterated and spurious drugs. The
Union of India opposed the revision, asserting that the Drugs Inspector acted
within statutory authority and that the Magistrate rightly found a prima facie
case at the summoning stage.
ISSUES:
The principal issues before the Court were
whether the Magistrate had validly taken cognizance and issued summons with due
application of judicial mind; whether the complaint disclosed sufficient prima
facie material to attract offences under Sections 16, 17A, 17B, 18, 27 and
related provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; whether directors and
officers of the company could be vicariously liable under Section 34 of the Act
at the summoning stage; and whether alleged procedural lapses in sampling,
testing, sanction, and analysis warranted interference with the summoning order
in revision.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Court dismissed the criminal revisions,
holding that the cognizance and summoning order passed by the Magistrate was
legal, valid, and based on sufficient prima facie material. It found no
illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference. The
Court held that all objections raised by the revisionists were matters for
trial and that the accused would have adequate opportunity to raise their
defence at the stage of framing of charge. Consequently, all connected criminal
revisions were dismissed as devoid of merit.
The Court held that at the stage of
cognizance and summoning, the Magistrate is only required to ascertain whether
a prima facie case exists, and not to conduct a detailed appreciation of
evidence or a mini-trial. Upon examining the complaint, laboratory reports, and
supporting documents, the Court found that the Drugs Inspector had acted within
his statutory mandate. The presence of substantial quantities of EG and DEG, substances
prohibited under the applicable Indian and British Pharmacopoeia constituted
serious violations capable of rendering the drugs adulterated and injurious to
health. The Court noted that the use of industrial-grade propylene glycol,
absence of certificates of analysis, and failure to comply with licence
conditions under Section 18 and record-keeping obligations under Section 18B
were sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the Act.
On the question of vicarious liability, the
Court held that directors and senior functionaries fall squarely within the
ambit of Section 34 of the Act, which presumes responsibility for the conduct
of the company’s business unless due diligence or lack of knowledge is
established—an issue to be examined at trial. The Court rejected the argument
that mere designation was insufficient at the summoning stage, observing that
regulatory offences affecting public health require purposive interpretation.
Technical objections relating to sampling location, testing procedure, or
sanction were held not to constitute fatal procedural irregularities.
Emphasising the grave public health implications of substandard and toxic
drugs, including reported child fatalities abroad, the Court concluded that
regulatory enforcement cannot be defeated by hyper-technical defences and that
the Magistrate’s discretion at the summoning stage was exercised in accordance
with law.
ANALYSIS:
This decision reinforces the settled
principle that the threshold for judicial scrutiny at the stage of cognizance
and summoning is deliberately low, particularly in regulatory offences
involving public health. The Court’s refusal to interfere underscores that a
Magistrate is not expected to weigh evidence or adjudicate disputed facts at
this preliminary stage, but only to assess whether the complaint and
accompanying material disclose a prima facie case. By treating objections
relating to sampling, testing procedures, sanction, and classification of the
offence as matters for trial, the Court affirmed a functional and pragmatic
approach that prevents premature stalling of prosecutions through technical
challenges. The ruling thus aligns with the broader jurisprudence that
discourages the conversion of summoning proceedings into a mini-trial,
especially where statutory authorities act on official laboratory reports
indicating serious violations.
Equally significant is the Court’s approach
to vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
By holding that directors and senior officers can be summoned without detailed
proof of individual involvement at the threshold stage, the Court emphasized
the strict and deterrent nature of public welfare legislation. The presumption
of responsibility for those in charge of a company’s affairs reflects a
purposive interpretation aimed at safeguarding public health and ensuring
corporate accountability. The judgment sends a clear message that allegations
of manufacture and distribution of adulterated or toxic drugs, particularly
involving substances like EG and DEG cannot be diluted by formalistic defences
or reliance on corporate hierarchies. Overall, the decision strengthens
regulatory enforcement by prioritising consumer safety and reinforcing the
accountability of corporate management in pharmaceutical offences.