DATE: 24/02/2026
COURT: High Court of Karnataka
BENCH: Justice M. Nagaprasanna
FACTS:
The facts of the case involve a complaint
filed by respondent No.2 (the mother/complainant) alleging that her daughter,
who is the wife of petitioner No.1 (the son-in-law/accused), has been kidnapped
by him. This led to the registration of Crime No.25/2026 at the relevant police
station in Bengaluru for offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 137(2),
351(2), 3(5), and 329(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The
petitioners were arrested and remanded to judicial custody pursuant to an order
dated February 16, 2026, passed by the 32nd Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Bengaluru. The core allegation centres on the purported kidnapping
of the complainant's adult daughter by her husband (petitioner No.1), with the
petitioners challenging the validity of the invocation of these sections and
the remand order in a criminal petition before the Karnataka High Court.
The petitioners contended that the marriage
between petitioner No.1 and the complainant's daughter is valid and subsisting,
and that the daughter, being a major (over 18 years of age), had voluntarily
left her parental home to live with her husband at his residence of her own
free will. They asserted that the registration of the FIR and the invocation of
the offences, particularly the equivalent of kidnapping under the old IPC
framework constituted a misuse or abuse of the legal process, as no cognizable
offence of kidnapping could arise in the case of a consenting adult married
woman.
ISSUES:
The primary issue before the Karnataka High
Court was whether the order remanding the petitioners to judicial custody in
Crime No.25/2026 was legally sustainable, given the petitioners' claim that the
offences invoked under Sections 115(2), 137(2), 351(2), 3(5), and 329(4) of the
BNS were either wrongly applied or bailable in nature. The petitioners argued
that the core allegation mirrored Section 363 IPC (now corresponding to Section
137(2) BNS for punishment for kidnapping), which could not apply to the
voluntary cohabitation of a major married woman with her husband, rendering the
non-bailable aspects inapplicable and the remand erroneous. The question was
whether the trial court's remand order suffered from an apparent error
warranting interference and release of the petitioners.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Karnataka High Court allowed the
criminal petition (CRL.P No. 2898 of 2026), set aside the remand order dated
February 16, 2026, passed by the 32nd ACJM, Bengaluru, in Crime No.25/2026, and
directed the release of the petitioners forthwith in accordance with law. The
court further instructed the registry to communicate the order to the jail
authorities for immediate implementation.
The court reasoned that the allegations
essentially amounted to an invocation of the offence of kidnapping (corresponding
to Section 363 IPC, now punishable under Section 137(2) BNS), but the material
on record clearly established that the complainant's daughter was an adult over
18 years of age and lawfully married to petitioner No.1. It is a settled
principle that a major woman has the right to choose her partner and reside
with her husband voluntarily without interference, and no offence of kidnapping
arises when she accompanies her spouse of her own accord. The court observed
that the invocation of this section was prima facie misconceived and
constituted an abuse of the process of law, as the daughter had willingly
entered the matrimonial home. Consequently, the foundational non-bailable
offence underpinning the case was wrongly laid, undermining the justification
for any custodial remand. The other invoked sections, such as Section 115(2)
BNS (punishment for voluntarily causing hurt, bailable in simple cases),
Section 351(2) BNS (punishment for criminal intimidation, generally bailable
unless aggravated), Section 3(5) BNS (common intention, not an independent
offence), and Section 329(4) BNS (house-trespass related, often bailable) were
either ancillary, bailable, or inapplicable in the factual matrix of a
matrimonial dispute involving consenting adults. The court held that where the
primary offence is incorrectly invoked and the remaining charges attract only
bailable punishments, the accused cannot be subjected to judicial custody, as
remand is impermissible for bailable offences absent exceptional circumstances.
Further, the High Court found an apparent
error on the face of the record in the trial court's remand order, as it failed
to appreciate the admitted majority and marital status of the alleged
"victim," which negated any element of forcible taking or enticement
required for kidnapping. The court emphasized that criminal law cannot be
weaponized in family disputes to harass a lawfully wedded couple, and the
registration of the FIR appeared to be a classic instance of misuse of process
driven by parental disapproval rather than genuine criminality. Since all the
invoked offences were bailable in the given context, no lawful basis existed
for denying bail or ordering remand. The inevitable conclusion was that the
petitioners were entitled to immediate liberty, with the order setting aside
the remand and directing release serving to correct the jurisdictional error
and prevent continued illegal detention. This approach aligns with
constitutional protections under Article 21, ensuring that liberty is not
curtailed mechanically in cases lacking prima facie criminality.
ANALYSIS:
The Karnataka High Court's decision in
CRL.P No. 2898 of 2026 stands as a robust reaffirmation of the fundamental
right of a major woman to autonomy in matters of marriage and personal life,
while sharply curtailing the misuse of criminal law as a tool for parental or
familial coercion. By setting aside the remand order and directing immediate
release, the court effectively dismantled a case built on the erroneous premise
that a lawfully married adult daughter could be "kidnapped" by her
husband simply because she chose to live with him against her mother's wishes.
The judgment correctly identified that Section 137(2) BNS (corresponding to the
old Section 363 IPC) requires elements of forcible taking, enticement, or
inducement without consent, none of which were prima facie present when the
woman, being over 18 and validly married, voluntarily cohabited with petitioner
No.1. The court's recognition of this as a "classic illustration of the
abuse of process of the law" sends a clear message that FIRs and arrests
cannot be deployed to settle intra-family disputes or override the
constitutional protections under Articles 19 and 21 that safeguard personal
liberty and the right to choose one's partner. The ancillary invocation of
other sections (e.g., voluntarily causing hurt, criminal intimidation, common
intention, and house-trespass) was rightly viewed as peripheral and
insufficient to sustain non-bailable custody, especially when the core
allegation collapsed under scrutiny of admitted facts.
Equally significant is the High Court's
emphasis on the impermissibility of judicial remand in cases involving only
bailable offences, highlighting a procedural safeguard often overlooked in
lower courts. The trial magistrate's failure to appreciate the majority status
and marital consent of the alleged victim constituted an apparent
jurisdictional error, as remand to judicial custody is statutorily barred for
bailable offences absent exceptional aggravating factors. This ruling not only
corrects an individual miscarriage of justice but also serves as a deterrent
against the routine criminalization of elopements or inter-caste/inter-faith
marriages driven by parental opposition. By directing immediate communication
to jail authorities for release, the court ensured swift enforcement of
liberty, preventing prolonged illegal detention. The judgment thus balances
respect for family sentiments with the higher imperative of preventing the
weaponization of criminal machinery, reinforcing that the state’s coercive
power cannot be invoked to enforce outdated notions of parental authority over
consenting adults. In doing so, it upholds the transformative potential of
constitutional rights in dismantling patriarchal constraints on individual
freedom.
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