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  • Judgements

    DATE: 11/02/2026

    COURT: High Court of Delhi

    BENCH: Justice Prateek Jalan

    FACTS:

    The petitioner, Neeraj, faces charges under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (murder) and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959, in FIR No. 652/2025 registered at Police Station Punjabi Bagh, Delhi, for the alleged shooting death of Muskan on 15.11.2025 inside her residence, after she repeatedly refused his marriage proposals despite persistent pressure and threats; he is also accused of then shooting himself in the same premises. Arrested on 21.11.2025 and remanded to judicial custody, the petitioner has been in detention since, suffering from a self-inflicted gunshot injury to the chest and pulmonary tuberculosis, leading to chronic pain, restricted mobility, and related complications.

    Aggrieved by his medical condition, he sought interim bail, which the Sessions Court granted on 18.12.2025 for eight weeks in Bail Application No. 2126/2025, relying on a medical status report and the Supreme Court's judgment in Vijay Aggarwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement, tracing the relief to Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the Investigating Officer (IO) filed an application for cancellation/modification, prompting the Sessions Court on 14.01.2026 to treat it as a modification plea, reduce the bail period directing surrender on 16.01.2026 (instead of 18.02.2026), citing partial improvement in his ambulatory condition, the need for police custody remand to commence investigation (which had stalled due to his health), and balancing the IO's rights against the accused's liberty. The Delhi High Court, in the present petition under Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, continued the interim bail pending adjudication, leading to this verdict.

    ISSUES:

    The core issues before the Delhi High Court were whether the Sessions Court erred in modifying the interim bail order by curtailing its eight-week duration on grounds of the petitioner's perceived medical improvement and the Investigating Officer's inability to secure police custody remand, and, more fundamentally, the proper interpretation of Section 187 of the BNSS specifically, whether the period of release on interim/temporary bail counts towards the computation of the 60-day (or 90-day) detention timeline for authorizing police remand (up to 15 days in whole or parts) and default/statutory bail eligibility, or whether only actual periods of custody/detention are to be reckoned, as this has broader ramifications for balancing accused liberty with investigative needs under the new criminal regime.

    JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

    The Delhi High Court allowed the bail petition, directing that the petitioner remain enlarged on interim bail for the full eight weeks as originally granted by the Sessions Court on 18.12.2025, subject to the same conditions, while clarifying that no observations were made on the merits of the case. It expressed appreciation to the Amicus Curiae for assistance.

    In the first place, the Court reasoned that the Sessions Court's order dated 14.01.2026 was misconceived both factually and legally, as it erroneously assumed that the eight-week interim bail period would "eat up" the available timeline under Section 187(2) BNSS for seeking police custody remand, thereby justifying a curtailment to protect the IO's interests. Drawing on a harmonious reading of the provision, which replaced Section 167 CrPC and explicitly contemplates remand "in the whole, or in parts" within the initial 40/60 days of a 60/90-day detention period, the Court held that only actual custody periods count towards these timelines, excluding time spent on interim or temporary bail. This interpretation aligns with the plain statutory language emphasizing "detention" and "custody," as well as precedents like the Kerala High Court's ruling in Fisal PJ v. State of Kerala (which clarified that truncated or broken periods of actual detention alone aggregate for default bail eligibility) and the Supreme Court's observations in Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency (allowing "piecing up" of custody spells, whether ordered by Magistrates or superior courts, while excluding non-custodial liberty). Consequently, even after the full interim bail, over 32 days remained within the 60-day window for the IO to seek remand in this life-imprisonment-or-death case, rendering the modification unnecessary and the Sessions Court's "larger duty towards justice" rationale flawed, as it unduly prioritized investigative convenience over the accused's Article 21 rights without any allegation of bail misuse or fraud.

    Furthermore, the High Court emphasized that reassessing the petitioner's medical condition deemed sufficiently improved to make him "ambulatory" and no longer wheelchair-bound as a basis to revoke or shorten the already-granted interim bail was impermissible, since the very object of medical bail is to facilitate recovery and alleviate suffering, not to impose a rigid "cure-by-custody" standard absent compelling countervailing factors. The Sessions Court had overlooked that the initial grant was predicated on a detailed medical report and constitutional imperatives, with no subsequent evidence of deterioration in the petitioner's health justifying reversal; instead, the modification effectively punished the accused for partial progress toward wellness, undermining the humanitarian ethos of interim relief under the BNSS. By restoring the full eight-week period and excluding interim bail from custody computations, the Court not only rectified the procedural overreach but also provided a principled template for future cases, ensuring that statutory timelines for remand and default bail remain tethered to actual detention while safeguarding against arbitrary curtailments that could erode personal liberty in grave offences like the instant one. This approach, the Court noted, promotes a balanced criminal justice framework, where investigation imperatives do not eclipse the accused's fundamental rights, especially in the transitional phase of the new Bharatiya codes.

    ANALYSIS:

    This Delhi High Court ruling marks a significant interpretive milestone in the nascent jurisprudence under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, by unequivocally affirming that periods of interim or temporary bail do not count towards the detention timelines prescribed in Section 187(2) for police remand and default bail eligibility, focusing instead on "actual custody" as the statutory touchstone. By dissecting the Sessions Court's flawed modification order, which prematurely curtailed the petitioner's eight-week medical bail on spurious grounds of "improved ambulation" and investigative urgency, the Court exposed a misapplication of the "larger duty towards justice" doctrine, revealing how such orders can unwittingly weaponize health-related reliefs against accused persons in grave cases like murder under Section 103(1) BNS. The decision's reliance on a purposive reading of the BNSS harmonizing it with CrPC precedents such as Gautam Navlakha's "piecing up" of broken custody spells and the Kerala High Court's Fisal PJ rationale, fortifies Article 21 protections, ensuring that interim bail, once granted on compelling medical imperatives (here, a self-inflicted gunshot and tuberculosis), cannot be arbitrarily truncated absent misuse, fraud, or fresh evidence of risk. In doing so, it not only salvages the petitioner's liberty for the full stipulated period but also sets a corrective precedent against judicial overreach in the transitional BNSS regime, where investigating agencies might otherwise exploit perceived health recoveries to sidestep statutory safeguards.

    Beyond this procedural vindication, the judgment embodies a humane recalibration of bail jurisprudence, underscoring that medical interim bail serves as a constitutional imperative for recovery rather than a probationary interlude subject to revocation on partial wellness milestones. By restoring the Sessions Court's original grant and clarifying that over 32 days of the 60-day remand window remained post-bail for police custody in this life-or-death offence, the Court deftly balanced the IO's legitimate needs with the accused's fundamental rights, rejecting any notion that prolonged interim relief "eats up" investigative time. This pragmatic stance, enriched by the Amicus Curiae's scholarly inputs, extends beyond the instant facts to offer a template for High Courts nationwide: in an era of evolving criminal codes, where default bail rights hinge on precise custody computations, such rulings prevent the erosion of personal liberty under the guise of "effective investigation." Ultimately, it reinforces the judiciary's role as a bulwark against custodial overzealousness, promoting a balanced criminal justice ecosystem that prioritizes evidence-based probes without compromising the humanitarian ethos of the BNSS, particularly for vulnerable accused grappling with life-altering ailments.

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