The petitioner, Neeraj, faces charges under
Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (murder) and Sections 25/27
of the Arms Act, 1959, in FIR No. 652/2025 registered at Police Station Punjabi
Bagh, Delhi, for the alleged shooting death of Muskan on 15.11.2025 inside her
residence, after she repeatedly refused his marriage proposals despite
persistent pressure and threats; he is also accused of then shooting himself in
the same premises. Arrested on 21.11.2025 and remanded to judicial custody, the
petitioner has been in detention since, suffering from a self-inflicted gunshot
injury to the chest and pulmonary tuberculosis, leading to chronic pain,
restricted mobility, and related complications.
Aggrieved by his medical condition, he
sought interim bail, which the Sessions Court granted on 18.12.2025 for eight
weeks in Bail Application No. 2126/2025, relying on a medical status report and
the Supreme Court's judgment in Vijay Aggarwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement,
tracing the relief to Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the
Investigating Officer (IO) filed an application for cancellation/modification,
prompting the Sessions Court on 14.01.2026 to treat it as a modification plea,
reduce the bail period directing surrender on 16.01.2026 (instead of
18.02.2026), citing partial improvement in his ambulatory condition, the need
for police custody remand to commence investigation (which had stalled due to
his health), and balancing the IO's rights against the accused's liberty. The
Delhi High Court, in the present petition under Section 480 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, continued the interim bail pending
adjudication, leading to this verdict.
ISSUES:
The core issues before the Delhi High Court
were whether the Sessions Court erred in modifying the interim bail order by
curtailing its eight-week duration on grounds of the petitioner's perceived
medical improvement and the Investigating Officer's inability to secure police
custody remand, and, more fundamentally, the proper interpretation of Section
187 of the BNSS specifically, whether the period of release on
interim/temporary bail counts towards the computation of the 60-day (or 90-day)
detention timeline for authorizing police remand (up to 15 days in whole or
parts) and default/statutory bail eligibility, or whether only actual periods
of custody/detention are to be reckoned, as this has broader ramifications for
balancing accused liberty with investigative needs under the new criminal
regime.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Delhi High Court allowed the bail
petition, directing that the petitioner remain enlarged on interim bail for the
full eight weeks as originally granted by the Sessions Court on 18.12.2025,
subject to the same conditions, while clarifying that no observations were made
on the merits of the case. It expressed appreciation to the Amicus Curiae for
assistance.
In the first place, the Court reasoned that
the Sessions Court's order dated 14.01.2026 was misconceived both factually and
legally, as it erroneously assumed that the eight-week interim bail period
would "eat up" the available timeline under Section 187(2) BNSS for
seeking police custody remand, thereby justifying a curtailment to protect the
IO's interests. Drawing on a harmonious reading of the provision, which
replaced Section 167 CrPC and explicitly contemplates remand "in the
whole, or in parts" within the initial 40/60 days of a 60/90-day detention
period, the Court held that only actual custody periods count towards these
timelines, excluding time spent on interim or temporary bail. This
interpretation aligns with the plain statutory language emphasizing
"detention" and "custody," as well as precedents like the
Kerala High Court's ruling in Fisal PJ v. State of Kerala (which clarified that
truncated or broken periods of actual detention alone aggregate for default
bail eligibility) and the Supreme Court's observations in Gautam Navlakha v.
National Investigation Agency (allowing "piecing up" of custody
spells, whether ordered by Magistrates or superior courts, while excluding
non-custodial liberty). Consequently, even after the full interim bail, over 32
days remained within the 60-day window for the IO to seek remand in this
life-imprisonment-or-death case, rendering the modification unnecessary and the
Sessions Court's "larger duty towards justice" rationale flawed, as
it unduly prioritized investigative convenience over the accused's Article 21
rights without any allegation of bail misuse or fraud.
Furthermore, the High Court emphasized that
reassessing the petitioner's medical condition deemed sufficiently improved to
make him "ambulatory" and no longer wheelchair-bound as a basis to
revoke or shorten the already-granted interim bail was impermissible, since the
very object of medical bail is to facilitate recovery and alleviate suffering,
not to impose a rigid "cure-by-custody" standard absent compelling
countervailing factors. The Sessions Court had overlooked that the initial
grant was predicated on a detailed medical report and constitutional imperatives,
with no subsequent evidence of deterioration in the petitioner's health
justifying reversal; instead, the modification effectively punished the accused
for partial progress toward wellness, undermining the humanitarian ethos of
interim relief under the BNSS. By restoring the full eight-week period and
excluding interim bail from custody computations, the Court not only rectified
the procedural overreach but also provided a principled template for future
cases, ensuring that statutory timelines for remand and default bail remain
tethered to actual detention while safeguarding against arbitrary curtailments
that could erode personal liberty in grave offences like the instant one. This
approach, the Court noted, promotes a balanced criminal justice framework, where
investigation imperatives do not eclipse the accused's fundamental rights,
especially in the transitional phase of the new Bharatiya codes.
ANALYSIS:
This Delhi High Court ruling marks a
significant interpretive milestone in the nascent jurisprudence under the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, by unequivocally affirming that
periods of interim or temporary bail do not count towards the detention
timelines prescribed in Section 187(2) for police remand and default bail
eligibility, focusing instead on "actual custody" as the statutory
touchstone. By dissecting the Sessions Court's flawed modification order, which
prematurely curtailed the petitioner's eight-week medical bail on spurious
grounds of "improved ambulation" and investigative urgency, the Court
exposed a misapplication of the "larger duty towards justice"
doctrine, revealing how such orders can unwittingly weaponize health-related
reliefs against accused persons in grave cases like murder under Section 103(1)
BNS. The decision's reliance on a purposive reading of the BNSS harmonizing it
with CrPC precedents such as Gautam Navlakha's "piecing up" of broken
custody spells and the Kerala High Court's Fisal PJ rationale, fortifies
Article 21 protections, ensuring that interim bail, once granted on compelling
medical imperatives (here, a self-inflicted gunshot and tuberculosis), cannot
be arbitrarily truncated absent misuse, fraud, or fresh evidence of risk. In
doing so, it not only salvages the petitioner's liberty for the full stipulated
period but also sets a corrective precedent against judicial overreach in the
transitional BNSS regime, where investigating agencies might otherwise exploit
perceived health recoveries to sidestep statutory safeguards.
Beyond this procedural vindication, the judgment
embodies a humane recalibration of bail jurisprudence, underscoring that
medical interim bail serves as a constitutional imperative for recovery rather
than a probationary interlude subject to revocation on partial wellness
milestones. By restoring the Sessions Court's original grant and clarifying
that over 32 days of the 60-day remand window remained post-bail for police
custody in this life-or-death offence, the Court deftly balanced the IO's
legitimate needs with the accused's fundamental rights, rejecting any notion
that prolonged interim relief "eats up" investigative time. This
pragmatic stance, enriched by the Amicus Curiae's scholarly inputs, extends
beyond the instant facts to offer a template for High Courts nationwide: in an
era of evolving criminal codes, where default bail rights hinge on precise
custody computations, such rulings prevent the erosion of personal liberty
under the guise of "effective investigation." Ultimately, it
reinforces the judiciary's role as a bulwark against custodial overzealousness,
promoting a balanced criminal justice ecosystem that prioritizes evidence-based
probes without compromising the humanitarian ethos of the BNSS, particularly
for vulnerable accused grappling with life-altering ailments.