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  • Judgements

    DATE: 22.09.2026

    COURT: Supreme Court of India

    BENCH: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe

    FACTS:

    The appellant invited tenders on 12.06.1995 for civil works relating to the main plant and auxiliary building of a Gas Turbine Power Project at Ram Chandra Nagar, Tripura. The respondent’s tender was accepted and a formal agreement was executed on 23.05.1996 for an estimated contract value of Rs.17,09,26,913/-, with the work stipulated to be completed by 26.03.1997. Disputes subsequently arose between the parties and were referred to arbitration. By an award dated 05.06.2015, the Arbitral Tribunal held that the delay in execution of the project was attributable to the appellant and allowed four claims of the respondent, awarding a principal sum of Rs.3.30 crores. The Tribunal also awarded pre-reference interest at 12% per annum on the respective claims, along with pendente lite and future interest at 9% per annum.

    The appellant challenged the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Commercial Court. Relying upon Sayeed Ahmed & Company v. State of U.P., the Commercial Court held that Clause 54 of the General Conditions of Contract barred the grant of interest, including pre-reference and pendente lite interest, and consequently set aside the interest awarded on the relevant claims while otherwise upholding the award. The respondent challenged this decision under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The High Court, relying upon State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co., held that Clause 54 was materially identical to the clause considered in that case and that the prohibition was confined to interest on money or balances withheld owing to disputes, and therefore restored the Tribunal’s award of interest. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court, challenging the restoration of pre-reference interest.

    ISSUES:

    The principal issue before the Court was whether Clause 54 of the General Conditions of Contract barred the Arbitral Tribunal from awarding pre-reference interest under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and, in particular, whether Clause 54 was materially similar to the clause considered in State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co., which did not constitute a general bar on interest, or to the clauses considered in Sayeed Ahmed & Company v. State of U.P. and Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation, which operated as a bar on the arbitral power to award interest. A further issue was whether the appellant had waived its right to rely upon Clause 54 by allegedly failing to raise the contractual bar before the Arbitral Tribunal.

    JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

    The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment to the extent that it restored the award of pre-reference interest. The Court held that Clause 54 of the GCC constituted a bar against the grant of pre-reference interest and that the Arbitral Tribunal, in awarding such interest, had exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act. The Court further held that Clause 54 was materially different from the clause considered in Harish Chandra and instead fell within the line of cases beginning with Sayeed Ahmed and continuing through THDC-II. The Court also rejected the contention that the appellant had waived its right to invoke Clause 54, finding that the plea had specifically been raised in the Statement of Defence before the Tribunal.

    The Court first explained the distinction between the legal position under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Under the 1940 Act, there was no express statutory provision conferring power upon an arbitrator to award interest, and judicial decisions had therefore recognised such power where the agreement did not prohibit interest. Under the 1996 Act, however, Section 31(7)(a) expressly empowers an arbitral tribunal to award interest on the amount awarded, but begins with the words “unless otherwise agreed by the parties.” According to the Court, these words give effect to party autonomy and mean that an agreement between the parties can exclude the arbitrator’s power to award pre-reference and pendente lite interest. The Court reaffirmed that pre-reference interest has a substantive-law basis and cannot be awarded merely by relying upon Section 31(7)(a) where the contractual terms prohibit it. Consequently, the determination of whether pre-reference interest was permissible depended upon the proper construction of Clause 54 of the GCC.
    The Court then closely compared Clause 54 with the clause considered in Harish Chandra and the clauses considered in Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II. It held that although the clauses appeared similar, there was a material difference in their wording. The clause in Harish Chandra dealt with money or balances lying with the Government because of a dispute, difference or misunderstanding, and the reference to delay in making payments was connected with that dispute-related situation. It therefore did not independently prohibit interest arising merely from delayed payment. Clause 54, however, separately prohibited claims for interest in respect of money lying with the Corporation due to a dispute and, additionally, in respect of “any delay on the part of the Engineer-in-Charge making periodical or final payments.” The latter constituted an independent ground of prohibition. Thus, unlike the clause in Harish Chandra, Clause 54 expressly covered delayed payments even where there was no dispute. The Court found that this drafting structure was materially similar to the clauses considered in Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II, where the contractual provisions were held to completely bar the arbitrator from awarding interest. The Court therefore concluded that Clause 54 barred pre-reference interest and that the High Court had erred in treating it as identical to the clause in Harish Chandra. The Court also rejected the waiver argument because the appellant had expressly raised the contractual bar in its Statement of Defence before the Arbitral Tribunal on 23.08.2012.

    ANALYSIS:

    The case primarily concerns the effect of a contractual prohibition on the power of an arbitral tribunal to award interest under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court emphasised the significant change brought about by the 1996 Act as compared with the Arbitration Act, 1940. While the earlier regime permitted an arbitrator to award interest in the absence of an express contractual prohibition, Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act expressly makes the arbitral power subject to the words “unless otherwise agreed by the parties.” Thus, the Court recognised party autonomy as controlling where the contract expressly excludes interest. The Court also distinguished pre-reference interest from pendente lite interest, observing that pre-reference interest is governed by substantive law and must have a basis in the agreement, statute or mercantile usage. In the present case, therefore, the Tribunal’s authority to award pre-reference interest depended upon whether Clause 54 of the GCC constituted an effective contractual prohibition. The Court concluded that it did, and consequently the Tribunal could not rely upon its general statutory power under Section 31(7)(a) to award interest contrary to the contractual terms.

    The decisive aspect of the judgment was the Court’s interpretation of Clause 54 in comparison with the clause considered in State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co. The Court found that the High Court had incorrectly treated the two clauses as materially identical. While the clause in Harish Chandra primarily concerned money or balances withheld because of a dispute, Clause 54 separately referred to “any delay” in making periodical or final payments. According to the Supreme Court, this additional language created an independent contractual bar against claims for interest arising from delayed payment, irrespective of whether such delay was connected with a dispute. The Court therefore considered Clause 54 to be closer to the clauses examined in Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II, where similar contractual provisions were held to exclude the arbitral power to award interest. The Court accordingly held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in granting pre-reference interest, set aside the High Court’s decision insofar as it restored that interest, and also rejected the waiver argument because the appellant had specifically raised Clause 54 in its Statement of Defence before the Tribunal.

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