BENCH: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
and Justice Alok Aradhe
FACTS:
The appellant invited
tenders on 12.06.1995 for civil works relating to the main plant and auxiliary
building of a Gas Turbine Power Project at Ram Chandra Nagar, Tripura. The
respondent’s tender was accepted and a formal agreement was executed on 23.05.1996
for an estimated contract value of Rs.17,09,26,913/-, with the work stipulated
to be completed by 26.03.1997. Disputes subsequently arose between the parties
and were referred to arbitration. By an award dated 05.06.2015, the Arbitral
Tribunal held that the delay in execution of the project was attributable to
the appellant and allowed four claims of the respondent, awarding a principal
sum of Rs.3.30 crores. The Tribunal also awarded pre-reference interest at 12%
per annum on the respective claims, along with pendente lite and future
interest at 9% per annum.
The appellant
challenged the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Commercial Court. Relying upon Sayeed Ahmed
& Company v. State of U.P., the Commercial Court held that Clause 54 of the
General Conditions of Contract barred the grant of interest, including
pre-reference and pendente lite interest, and consequently set aside the
interest awarded on the relevant claims while otherwise upholding the award.
The respondent challenged this decision under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The
High Court, relying upon State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co., held that
Clause 54 was materially identical to the clause considered in that case and
that the prohibition was confined to interest on money or balances withheld owing
to disputes, and therefore restored the Tribunal’s award of interest. The
appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court, challenging the restoration
of pre-reference interest.
ISSUES:
The principal issue before the Court was
whether Clause 54 of the General Conditions of Contract barred the Arbitral
Tribunal from awarding pre-reference interest under Section 31(7)(a) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and, in particular, whether Clause 54
was materially similar to the clause considered in State of U.P. v. Harish
Chandra and Co., which did not constitute a general bar on interest, or to the
clauses considered in Sayeed Ahmed & Company v. State of U.P. and
Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation, which
operated as a bar on the arbitral power to award interest. A further issue was
whether the appellant had waived its right to rely upon Clause 54 by allegedly
failing to raise the contractual bar before the Arbitral Tribunal.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and
set aside the High Court’s judgment to the extent that it restored the award of
pre-reference interest. The Court held that Clause 54 of the GCC constituted a
bar against the grant of pre-reference interest and that the Arbitral Tribunal,
in awarding such interest, had exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction under
Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act. The Court further held that Clause 54 was
materially different from the clause considered in Harish Chandra and instead fell
within the line of cases beginning with Sayeed Ahmed and continuing through
THDC-II. The Court also rejected the contention that the appellant had waived
its right to invoke Clause 54, finding that the plea had specifically been
raised in the Statement of Defence before the Tribunal.
The Court first explained the distinction
between the legal position under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996. Under the 1940 Act, there was no express statutory
provision conferring power upon an arbitrator to award interest, and judicial
decisions had therefore recognised such power where the agreement did not
prohibit interest. Under the 1996 Act, however, Section 31(7)(a) expressly
empowers an arbitral tribunal to award interest on the amount awarded, but
begins with the words “unless otherwise agreed by the parties.” According to
the Court, these words give effect to party autonomy and mean that an agreement
between the parties can exclude the arbitrator’s power to award pre-reference
and pendente lite interest. The Court reaffirmed that pre-reference interest
has a substantive-law basis and cannot be awarded merely by relying upon
Section 31(7)(a) where the contractual terms prohibit it. Consequently, the
determination of whether pre-reference interest was permissible depended upon
the proper construction of Clause 54 of the GCC.
The Court then closely compared Clause 54 with the clause considered in Harish
Chandra and the clauses considered in Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II. It held that
although the clauses appeared similar, there was a material difference in their
wording. The clause in Harish Chandra dealt with money or balances lying with
the Government because of a dispute, difference or misunderstanding, and the
reference to delay in making payments was connected with that dispute-related
situation. It therefore did not independently prohibit interest arising merely
from delayed payment. Clause 54, however, separately prohibited claims for
interest in respect of money lying with the Corporation due to a dispute and,
additionally, in respect of “any delay on the part of the Engineer-in-Charge
making periodical or final payments.” The latter constituted an independent
ground of prohibition. Thus, unlike the clause in Harish Chandra, Clause 54
expressly covered delayed payments even where there was no dispute. The Court
found that this drafting structure was materially similar to the clauses
considered in Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II, where the contractual provisions were
held to completely bar the arbitrator from awarding interest. The Court
therefore concluded that Clause 54 barred pre-reference interest and that the
High Court had erred in treating it as identical to the clause in Harish
Chandra. The Court also rejected the waiver argument because the appellant had
expressly raised the contractual bar in its Statement of Defence before the
Arbitral Tribunal on 23.08.2012.
ANALYSIS:
The case primarily
concerns the effect of a contractual prohibition on the power of an arbitral
tribunal to award interest under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court emphasised the significant change
brought about by the 1996 Act as compared with the Arbitration Act, 1940. While
the earlier regime permitted an arbitrator to award interest in the absence of
an express contractual prohibition, Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act expressly
makes the arbitral power subject to the words “unless otherwise agreed by the
parties.” Thus, the Court recognised party autonomy as controlling where the
contract expressly excludes interest. The Court also distinguished
pre-reference interest from pendente lite interest, observing that
pre-reference interest is governed by substantive law and must have a basis in the
agreement, statute or mercantile usage. In the present case, therefore, the
Tribunal’s authority to award pre-reference interest depended upon whether
Clause 54 of the GCC constituted an effective contractual prohibition. The
Court concluded that it did, and consequently the Tribunal could not rely upon
its general statutory power under Section 31(7)(a) to award interest contrary
to the contractual terms.
The decisive aspect of
the judgment was the Court’s interpretation of Clause 54 in comparison with the
clause considered in State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co. The Court found
that the High Court had incorrectly treated the two clauses as materially identical.
While the clause in Harish Chandra primarily concerned money or balances
withheld because of a dispute, Clause 54 separately referred to “any delay” in
making periodical or final payments. According to the Supreme Court, this
additional language created an independent contractual bar against claims for
interest arising from delayed payment, irrespective of whether such delay was
connected with a dispute. The Court therefore considered Clause 54 to be closer
to the clauses examined in Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II, where similar contractual
provisions were held to exclude the arbitral power to award interest. The Court
accordingly held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in granting
pre-reference interest, set aside the High Court’s decision insofar as it
restored that interest, and also rejected the waiver argument because the
appellant had specifically raised Clause 54 in its Statement of Defence before
the Tribunal.