OM PRAKASH V. HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF H.P. AND OTHERS 2025:HHC:36364:

DATE: 27/10/2025

COURT: High Court of Himachal Pradesh

BENCH: Chief Justice GS Sandhawalia and Justice JIya Lal Bhardwaj

FACTS:

The case arose from a writ petition filed by a Senior Assistant working with the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA), Mandi, challenging the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him by the District and Sessions Judge, Mandi, dated 10th July 2024, under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The petitioner contended that he was appointed by the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority (SLSA), Shimla, and was merely placed at the disposal of the DLSA for duty. Therefore, the District and Sessions Judge, who serves as the Chairman of the DLSA, lacked the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him, as such powers, according to the petitioner, rested exclusively with the State Legal Services Authority under Section 6 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

The SLSA, however, maintained that the disciplinary proceedings were validly initiated. It argued that the District and Sessions Judge, being the Chairman of the DLSA under Section 9(2)(a) of the Act, acted pursuant to the delegation of powers by the Executive Chairman of the SLSA, as recorded in official correspondence dated 21st and 22nd March 2024. These communications explicitly directed the Chairman, DLSA, to take necessary disciplinary action against the petitioner at the district level and to submit an action-taken report to the SLSA. The petitioner was thereafter charge-sheeted, and both the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer were appointed on 31st July 2024. The petitioner challenged these proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and absence of proper delegation.

ISSUES:

The principal issue before the Court was whether the District and Sessions Judge, Mandi, acting as Chairman of the District Legal Services Authority, possessed the legal authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in view of his appointment by the State Legal Services Authority, and whether such delegation of power by the Executive Chairman, SLSA, was valid under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the District and Sessions Judge, Mandi, were valid and legally sustainable. The Court found that the Executive Chairman of the SLSA had duly delegated the power to the DLSA Chairman to take disciplinary action, and such delegation was permissible in law. It held that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner, and that the initiation of proceedings was based on due authority.

The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Jharkhand and Others v. Rukma Kesh Mishra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 676), which clarified that under disciplinary rules, a competent authority may either “draw up” or “cause to be drawn up” the statement of charges in misconduct proceedings. The phrase “cause to be drawn up,” as interpreted by the Apex Court, authorizes the disciplinary authority to delegate the preparation and initiation of disciplinary proceedings to a subordinate officer, provided such delegation is formally approved. The High Court reasoned that, in this case, the Executive Chairman of the SLSA had explicitly authorized the Chairman of the DLSA, Mandi, through written communication, to initiate the proceedings and conduct the inquiry. Thus, the process satisfied the legal requirement of delegation as recognized in Rukma Kesh Mishra, and interference by the Court would be unwarranted.

Additionally, the Court distinguished the petitioner’s reliance on Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath (2014) 1 SCC 351, holding that Gopinath pertained to situations where no delegation had been made at all, whereas in the present case, the delegation was clear and specific. The Court emphasized that the Executive Chairman’s written approval dated 21st March 2024 and subsequent communication on 22nd March 2024 conclusively established that the action of the DLSA Chairman was based on lawful delegation. The Court further noted that the petitioner, a Senior Assistant, was subordinate in rank to the District and Sessions Judge and thus suffered no prejudice by being proceeded against at the district level. It also observed that the charges related to financial mismanagement and dereliction of duty, which warranted inquiry. Consequently, the Court concluded that the disciplinary proceedings were validly initiated, and procedural propriety had been maintained.

ANALYSIS:

The Himachal Pradesh High Court’s decision in this case reinforces the principle that disciplinary authority can be validly delegated within statutory and procedural limits, provided such delegation is explicitly authorized and formally recorded. The Court upheld the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the District and Sessions Judge, Mandi, acting as Chairman of the DLSA, on the ground that the Executive Chairman of the SLSA had expressly delegated the power to initiate action through written communications. By relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra (2025), the Court clarified that the phrase “cause to be drawn up” in disciplinary rules empowers a competent authority to delegate the preparation and initiation of charges, ensuring administrative efficiency without violating principles of natural justice. This interpretation affirms that procedural delegation, when backed by proper authorization, does not undermine the legality of disciplinary action.

The judgment also distinguishes between unauthorized action and valid delegation, drawing a clear line between the two. In rejecting the petitioner’s reliance on Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath (2014), the Court emphasized that Gopinath applied only to cases where no delegation existed, whereas here, the Executive Chairman’s written approval conferred lawful authority upon the DLSA Chairman. By highlighting that the petitioner, being subordinate to the District and Sessions Judge, suffered no prejudice from such delegation, the Court underscored the importance of balancing procedural technicalities with administrative practicality. Ultimately, the ruling affirms that as long as statutory intent and procedural safeguards are respected, courts will not interfere in disciplinary processes grounded in proper authorization and reasonable compliance with the law.