PRINCE KUMAR SHARMA AND OTHERS V. THE STATE NCT OF DELHI 2025:DHC:10080:

DATE: 14/11/2025

COURT: High Court of Delhi

BENCH: Justice Sanjeev Narula

FACTS:

The case arises from an FIR registered at Police Station Bhalswa Dairy, Delhi, after the police responded to a domestic violence call received on helpline number 181. During the inquiry, the police discovered that Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 were living together as husband and wife and claimed to have married on 1 March 2023 with the consent of both families. Respondent No. 2 was produced before the Child Welfare Committee, which ordered verification of her age. The investigation revealed her date of birth as 2 October 2006, establishing that she was a minor at the time of the alleged marriage and cohabitation. Her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC contained no allegations of sexual assault, coercion, or violence; instead, she stated that she voluntarily lived with Petitioner No. 1 and did not want legal action against him or her in-laws. A medical examination revealed that she was pregnant, leading to registration of FIR No. 696/2023 under Section 376 IPC, Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and Sections 9 and 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act.

At the time of hearing, Respondent No. 2, now a major appeared in court with her infant child born on 26 January 2024. The Court interacted with her at length and found that she appeared to speak voluntarily, expressed that she was living peacefully with Petitioner No. 1’s family, and regarded him as her husband. She reiterated her wish not to continue with the criminal proceedings. However, the record showed that the sexual relationship began when she was a minor and that her pregnancy confirmed the occurrence of sexual activity during minority. Based on these circumstances, the petitioners, Petitioner No. 1 and the in-laws sought quashing of the FIR.

ISSUES:

The primary issue was whether the FIR, which alleged offences under the IPC, the POCSO Act, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, could be quashed when the victim, now an adult, stated that the relationship was voluntary, denied any coercion or assault, and opposed continuation of the prosecution. The question before the Court was whether such consensual claims and subsequent marital cohabitation could override the statutory scheme of POCSO, which criminalises all sexual activity with minors irrespective of consent, and whether the Court could exercise its jurisdiction to quash the proceedings despite the clear statutory bar.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Court dismissed the petition seeking quashing of the FIR. It held that since the victim was indisputably a minor at the time of the sexual acts and alleged marriage, the offences under the POCSO Act and the child marriage law were clearly attracted. The Court ruled that it could not carve out an exception based on later developments such as the couple living together, the birth of a child, or the victim’s desire to end the proceedings as such exceptions would contradict statutory mandates. The proceedings were therefore allowed to continue to trial.

The Court emphasised that the statutory framework of the POCSO Act leaves no room for recognising the consent of a person below 18 years of age in matters involving sexual activity. Unlike the IPC provision on rape, POCSO does not require lack of consent as an ingredient of the offence; the sole determining factor is whether the victim was a child at the time of the act. The Act treats any sexual activity with a minor as inherently exploitative. Therefore, even if the minor appears to have willingly participated in the relationship, such willingness has no legal effect. The Court also noted the strong statutory presumptions in POCSO under Sections 29 and 30, which require courts to presume guilt and culpable mental state once foundational facts namely age and occurrence of the act are established. The victim’s later statements of voluntariness may be relevant for bail or sentencing considerations, but they cannot negate the offence itself.

The Court further reasoned that allowing quashing in such cases would undermine the broader legislative purpose behind POCSO and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act. Both statutes were enacted to prevent child sexual exploitation and child marriages, which often occur under familial or societal pressure. The involvement of parents on both sides strengthened this concern, as quashing the case could be interpreted as judicial approval of underage marriage where the parties later cohabit as a family. The Court observed that appearances of voluntariness by a 16-year-old may mask underlying coercion or lack of real agency. Creating judge-made exceptions for “near-majority consensual relationships” would effectively rewrite the statute and weaken protections for minors. The Court therefore held that, despite the sympathetic circumstances and the victim’s current wishes, it was bound by the statutory mandate and could not quash the proceedings at the pre-trial stage.

ANALYSIS:

This case presents a classic conflict between individual circumstances and statutory rigidity, especially under protective legislations like the POCSO Act. On one hand, the factual matrix depicts a relationship that at least as presented by the now-adult victim appears stable, voluntary, and embedded in a family setup with a newborn child. The victim consistently denied any coercion or abuse and expressed her desire to protect her family and to avoid criminal proceedings. Such situations often create a compelling narrative of equity, prompting courts to consider whether strict application of the law would cause manifest injustice. However, the Court recognised that emotional, familial, or social considerations cannot supersede the statutory mandate when the alleged offences fall squarely within the framework of POCSO, where the foundational fact of minority alone triggers criminal liability.

On the other hand, the Court’s firm refusal to quash the FIR underscores its commitment to the non-negotiable protective purpose of POCSO. The statute draws a bright-line rule that individuals below 18 cannot legally consent to sexual activity, regardless of perceived maturity or voluntary participation. The Court’s analysis highlights that permitting quashing on the basis of later marriage, cohabitation, or the victim’s change of heart would create a dangerous precedent that could indirectly legitimise child marriages and shield offenders by post-facto claims of familial unity. Such an approach would dilute the deterrent purpose of both POCSO and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act. The judgment reflects the judiciary’s awareness of broader societal implications: that leniency in such cases could embolden systemic practices of early marriage and exploitation of minors under the guise of consensual relationships. By adhering strictly to legislative intent, the Court preserves the integrity of child-protection laws, even when faced with sympathetic and complex personal dynamics.