REYAZ AHMAD LONE & OTHERS V. NAZIYA HASSAN & ANOTHER CRM(M) NO.677/2025:

DATE: 07/11/2025

COURT: High Court of Jammu and Kashmir

BENCH: Justice Sanjay Dhar

FACTS:

The petitioners approached the High Court challenging proceedings initiated against them under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. These proceedings were pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, where the wife (respondent No.1) had filed allegations of domestic violence, harassment, and cruelty against her husband (petitioner No.1) and his relatives (petitioners No.2 and 3). The wife stated that the marriage took place on 30.08.2021 and that one female child was born from the wedlock. Based on her complaint, the Magistrate passed an interim order dated 11.07.2025 directing petitioner No.1 to pay Rs.8000 monthly monetary compensation to her and Rs.4000 monthly to the minor daughter, along with Rs.3000 towards monthly rental expenses.

The petitioners contended that the complaint before the Magistrate contained vague and unspecific allegations and that the relatives had been unnecessarily implicated to pressure petitioner No.1 into a favourable settlement. They argued that the Magistrate issued process mechanically without applying judicial mind and without recording satisfaction regarding statutory requirements, particularly under Section 18 of the DV Act. On these grounds, they sought quashing of the proceedings as well as the interim monetary relief granted by the Magistrate.

ISSUES:

The primary issue before the High Court was whether the proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the DV Act, particularly the issuance of process and interim monetary relief against not just the husband but also his relatives, were legally sustainable in the absence of specific allegations, and whether such proceedings ought to be quashed at this stage.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Court refused to quash the proceedings but held that the petitioners were free to file an application before the Magistrate seeking dropping of proceedings against them. The Court directed that if such an application was filed, the Magistrate must consider it and decide it expeditiously. The Court also directed that proceedings against petitioners No.2 and 3 (the husband’s relatives) would remain stayed until their application was decided.

The Court reasoned that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are distinct from criminal prosecution and thus cannot be treated as equivalent to criminal trials or complaint proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the nature of proceedings is primarily of a civil-remedial character, the Magistrate retains the authority to revoke or modify orders, including withdrawal of summons or interim relief decreed earlier. The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022 SCC OnLine SC 446), which clarified that issuance of notice under Section 12 is merely intended to seek a response from the opposite party and that principles governing quashing of criminal complaints do not strictly apply at this stage.

Further, the Court emphasized that if, upon receiving a detailed reply from the respondents, the Magistrate finds that some parties were unnecessarily dragged into the proceedings or that allegations are not substantiated, the Magistrate is empowered to drop proceedings against them. The Court held that forcing relatives to undergo litigation without sufficient material would amount to procedural injustice. Thus, rather than quashing the proceedings prematurely, the Court adopted an approach that preserves the complainant’s statutory remedy while simultaneously ensuring fairness by directing that the Magistrate reconsider participation of relatives, restore procedural rights, and conclude the matter within a fixed timeframe. This balanced approach ensured due process for both sides while respecting the legislative purpose of the DV Act.

ANALYSIS:

The High Court’s approach in this case reflects a deliberate balancing of the rights of both parties, recognising that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are preventive and remedial rather than punitive. Instead of intervening prematurely and quashing the complaint, the Court preserved the complainant’s statutory remedy while reinforcing procedural safeguards for the respondents. By directing that the petitioners avail the remedy before the Magistrate and ensuring expeditious decision-making, the Court reinforced the principle that trial courts are the first line of scrutiny in matters involving domestic relationship disputes. The Court’s temporary stay for relatives also indicated sensitivity to potential misuse where entire families are implicated without specific allegations, a recurring concern in matrimonial litigation.

Additionally, the judgment strengthens judicial clarity on the nature of DV Act proceedings by reiterating that they cannot be equated with criminal complaints. Through reliance on Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan, the Court affirmed that issuance of notice under Section 12 is only an opportunity for response and does not irreversibly bind parties to litigation. This analysis underscores the evolving judicial stance that Magistrates retain broad discretion to review, modify, or even drop reliefs when allegations lack specificity. The ruling therefore stands as an instructive precedent on procedural fairness and gatekeeping in domestic violence proceedings, ensuring both accessibility for genuine victims and protection against arbitrary or unnecessary impleadment.