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  • Judgements

    DATE: 30/10/2025

    COURT: High Court of Himachal Pradesh

    BENCH: Justice Ajay Mohan Goel

    FACTS:

    The case arose from a petition challenging the order dated 4 October 2017 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, in CMA No. 781-6 of 2016 within Civil Suit No. 102-1 of 2011. The order had allowed an application filed under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act by Amar Nath (plaintiff before the trial court) permitting him to lead secondary evidence to prove a Will dated 12 December 2009. Amar Nath claimed that he and the defendant, his brother, were joint owners of land previously belonging to their mother, late Smt. Har Dei, who allegedly executed the Will in their favour. He contended that after her death, the defendant evaded mutation and later attempted to dispossess him, prompting the civil suit. Amar Nath further alleged that the original Will was submitted for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Ghumarwin, but was subsequently misplaced through manipulation by the defendant, who was an influential person.

    The defendant opposed the suit, asserting that the Will of 2009 was fabricated and that their mother had, in fact, executed an earlier registered Will dated 12 February 1985 in his favour, which was valid and subsisting. He contended that the plaintiff’s claim was based on a forged document. The trial court, however, allowed the plaintiff’s application to adduce secondary evidence, reasoning that the truthfulness of the alleged Will could be tested during trial. Aggrieved by this, the defendant filed the present petition before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, arguing that the trial court had wrongly exercised its discretion by permitting secondary evidence without satisfying the statutory conditions prescribed under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    ISSUES:

    The primary issue before the Himachal Pradesh High Court was whether the trial court had erred in allowing the plaintiff to lead secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove the alleged Will dated 12 December 2009, without first establishing that the requirements for admitting such evidence such as loss, destruction, or unlawful withholding of the original document, had been fulfilled.

    JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court allowed the petition and set aside the trial court’s order dated 4 October 2017. It held that the trial court had wrongly permitted the plaintiff to lead secondary evidence without meeting the mandatory parameters of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court ruled that the order was legally unsustainable and directed both parties to appear before the trial court for further proceedings on 17 November 2025.

    The High Court held that the trial court had failed to apply the proper legal test under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, which governs the admissibility of secondary evidence. It observed that secondary evidence is not a matter of judicial discretion but can only be allowed when specific statutory conditions are met, such as when the original document is lost, destroyed, or withheld by the opposing party after due notice. In this case, the plaintiff’s own pleadings indicated that he had submitted the alleged Will to the Sub-Registrar for registration, from where it was allegedly misplaced through collusion between the defendant and the registration officials. The Court noted that this version could not, by any reasonable interpretation, amount to proof that the document was in the defendant’s possession or that it had been destroyed or lost within the meaning of Section 65. Further, the Court found that an inquiry conducted by the revenue authorities had established that only a photocopy of the Will had been submitted for registration, not the original document, and that the complaint regarding its loss had been dismissed.

    The Court further reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to establish any admission, either written or implied by the defendant acknowledging the existence of the alleged Will. On the contrary, the defendant had categorically denied the execution of any Will dated 12 December 2009 and maintained that the only valid Will was that of 1985. Therefore, the prerequisites under clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 65 of the Evidence Act were not satisfied. The High Court found the trial court’s observation that “the truth of the Will could be tested during trial” to be self-contradictory, since such an opportunity arises only when the foundational requirements for secondary evidence are first met. By allowing the application without such compliance, the trial court had acted contrary to settled evidentiary principles. Consequently, the High Court held that the trial court’s order was per se unsustainable in law, warranting its quashing and remand for proper adjudication in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act.

    ANALYSIS:

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court’s decision underscores the rigid procedural safeguards surrounding the admissibility of secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court emphasized that secondary evidence is not admissible as a matter of right or convenience but only when statutory prerequisites such as loss, destruction, or unlawful withholding of the original document, are clearly established. In this case, the plaintiff’s claim that the Will was misplaced during the process of registration, allegedly due to manipulation by the defendant, did not satisfy these requirements. The High Court observed that the plaintiff had neither proven the existence of the original Will nor shown that it was in the defendant’s possession or had been lost or destroyed in a legally acceptable manner. By permitting the plaintiff to lead secondary evidence without satisfying these foundational conditions, the trial court had effectively diluted the evidentiary threshold mandated by law.

    Moreover, the judgment reaffirms the principle that procedural compliance cannot be bypassed under the guise of allowing “truth to emerge during trial.” The High Court noted that such reasoning misapprehends the function of Section 65, which serves to prevent fabricated or unreliable documents from being introduced into judicial proceedings without proper justification. The trial court’s assumption that the genuineness of the Will could be tested during the trial was held to be legally flawed, as the admissibility of evidence must be determined prior to its evaluation on merits. By setting aside the order, the High Court reinforced judicial discipline in the application of evidentiary rules, ensuring that litigants adhere to the statutory framework rather than relying on speculative assertions. This case thus serves as an important precedent affirming that procedural safeguards under Section 65 are not mere formalities but essential protections against evidentiary misuse.

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