The Supreme Court has cancelled the bail granted to a
municipal Corporator and three co-accused in a case involving the alleged
assault and intimidation of doctors at a municipal hospital in Maharashtra. A
Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta held that violence or
intimidation against medical professionals discharging their duties cannot be
tolerated, particularly when the alleged conduct involves an elected
representative. The Court found that the Bombay High Court had failed to adequately
consider the accused’s antecedents, potential influence over witnesses and the
impact of the incident on the medical fraternity.
The case arose from allegations that the Corporator and
three others assaulted and verbally abused three doctors, including a woman
doctor, in the labour ward following a dispute over shifting a pregnant
patient. The Corporator was also accused of threatening the informant-doctor,
allegedly resulting in delayed reporting. Although the Magistrate granted bail
to the accused, the Bombay High Court initially stayed the orders and directed
the Corporator to surrender. It subsequently restored bail subject to
conditions, prompting the State of Maharashtra to approach the Supreme Court.
The State argued that the High Court had overlooked the
seriousness of the allegations, the accused’s antecedents and the possibility
of witness intimidation. The accused disputed the allegations, contending that
the injuries were simple, their custody had lasted approximately 27 days and
the trial involving 64 witnesses could take considerable time.
The Supreme Court observed that violence against medical
professionals threatens not only individual doctors but also the effective
functioning of healthcare institutions. It noted that the incident had caused
such fear among the victim doctors that they were compelled to tender their
resignations. This apprehension was relevant to assessing the risk of
intimidation and whether doctors could discharge their professional
responsibilities without fear. The Court clarified that patients retained the
right to question treatment, complain of negligence and pursue legal remedies,
but grievances could not justify violence.
The Bench emphasised that an elected representative’s
mandate did not confer authority to intimidate others or substitute personal
power for lawful institutional processes. It held that public office carried a
heightened responsibility to uphold the law and strengthen public confidence in
institutions. The Court considered alleged violence by an elected
representative particularly serious because of its potential to undermine the
security of healthcare workers.
The Court found that the High Court had not provided cogent
reasons for reversing its earlier prima facie assessment. The passage of time
in custody and progress in the investigation were insufficient, by themselves,
to explain the restoration of bail. It also held that criminal antecedents and
the possibility of influencing witnesses were material considerations. Although
the Corporator had reportedly been acquitted or discharged in 16 proceedings,
the surrounding circumstances remained relevant. Since the bail granted to the
other accused substantially rested on parity with the Corporator, that
reasoning could not independently sustain their release.
The Supreme Court directed the State Government to examine
independently, in accordance with law, whether preventive-detention provisions
were applicable. It also instructed the Trial Court to ensure adequate
protection for material witnesses against threats, intimidation or coercion,
referring to the Maharashtra Witness Protection and Security Act, 2017, and
Mahender Chawla v. Union of India (2019).
Allowing the State’s appeal, the Court set aside the High
Court’s order restoring bail and directed all four accused to surrender before
the Trial Court by October 5, 2026. The accused were permitted to seek bail
afresh if there was a material change in circumstances. The Court further
directed the Special Fast Track Court to endeavour to conclude the trial within
six months, replacing the earlier three-month timeline, while permitting the
prosecution to assess whether witnesses whose evidence was non-essential could
lawfully be dispensed with without compromising a fair trial.